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In recent history, the U.S. economy has become focused on international trade.'
In 1996, one quarter of the total U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was com-
prised of imports and exports. The Western Hemisphere is the largest regional
market for U.S. products, accounting for $242 billion or 40 percent of the U.S.
exports in 1996.3 Thus, given the shear amount of trade, the countries in the western
hemisphere are of great importance to commercial interests in the United States.4
On December 17, 1992, Canada, the United States, and Mexico entered into
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 5 The agreement went into
effect on January 1, 1994, and is the most comprehensive framework regarding
trade and investment ever signed between countries of this size.6 The significance
of NAFTA stretches far beyond the free trade it was designed to create.7 For
instance, the trade agreement is historic for its environmentally friendly lan-
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
author.
*J.D. Candidate 1998, Southern Methodist University School of Law; Comments Editor, Southern
Methodist University School of Law Student Editorial Board, The International Lawyer and The
International Law Review Association.
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5. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA]. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1993,
c.44; North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 1993, 107
Stat. 2057.
6. PIERIE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDER-
STANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 1 (1996).
7. See generally id. at i-ii.
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guage. 8 The environmental provisions of the agreement establish a floor for
environmental standards, while the supplemental agreement on the environment
provides the means to enforce those standards. 9 Thus, NAFTA, together with
its supplemental agreement on environmental cooperation, establishes the world's
greenest trade agreement. '
0
The environmental language contained in NAFTA, the extent of which makes
the agreement unique, was the source of much controversy during the pre-
adoption debate surrounding the trade agreement. " In November of 1993, while
trying to gain congressional support for NAFTA, the Clinton administration
released a comprehensive report on the environmental issues involved with the
agreement. 2 The report acknowledged that serious environmental problems exist
in North America, especially along the U.S.-Mexico border. 3 It further recog-
nized expanded trade as an appropriate forum in which these problems can be
addressed. 4 The usage of trade mechanisms to address environmental problems
is significant in that those who opposed the inclusion of environmental language
in NAFTA voiced strong opinions as to the separation of trade issues and policy
issues.' 5 The ultimate passage of NAFTA in the United States, however, was
contingent on the inclusion of environmental language. 16
At the Summit of the Americas in 1994, the Clinton administration formally
invited Chile to become the fourth member of NAFTA.' 7 Since that invitation,
the United States has been dragging its feet in moving toward Chilean accession. "
Other countries, however, including Chile, have moved forward with their own
trade liberalization efforts.' 9 Further, Chilean accession faces a battle similar to
that of the original NAFTA, namely, whether or not to include environmental
and labor side agreements within the agreement.20 Unfortunately, this battle
threatens to be just as bitter and divisive as the original one. 2'
8. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NAFTA AND THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST 3 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA AND THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA BROKEN PROMISES: THE BORDER BETRAYED; U.S. MEXICO BORDER
ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH DECLINE IN NAFTA's FIRST Two YEARS [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN
(1996)]. See also Joseph G. Block & Andrew R. Herrup, Addressing Environmental Concerns Regard-
ing Chilean Accession to NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 221, 223 (1995).
12. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11, at i.
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, THE NAFTA REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
4 (1993)).
15. Block & Herrup, supra note 11, at 230-31.
16. Id. at 225.
17. Scott C. Lacunza, From Dictatorship to Democracy: Environmental Reform in Chile, 19
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 539, 541 (1996).
18. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 1.
19. Id.
20. David Bacon, The New NAFTA Fast Track; Proposed Extension of the United States-Canada-
Mexico Free Trade Agreement to Include Chile, THE PROGRESSIVE, July 1997.
21. Id.
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This Comment explores the effects of the NAFTA environmental provisions
on the environmental laws and policies of Mexico before and after its inception.
In addition, this Comment will identify the successes and failures of NAFTA's
environmental provisions within the first two years of the trade agreement. Fi-
nally, this Comment discusses the effects of the environmental provisions on
Chile's admission to the agreement.
I. The NAFTA Environmental Provisions and the NAAEC
Prior to the adoption of NAFTA in the United States, a debate raged concerning
whether the agreement would be beneficial to the United States, and if so, whether
the beneficial effect would be improved or weakened by the inclusion of environ-
mental provisions. 22 The ultimate result of this pre-adoption debate was that
NAFTA places more emphasis on the environment than any previous free trade
agreement. 23 Despite this emphasis, NAFTA does not provide any direct benefit
to the environment.24 The agreement seeks to limit the dangers posed to domestic
environmental laws and regulations by the principles of free trade.25 In addition,
NAFTA creates the possibility that additional funds, gained through economic
development, will be devoted to the environment.26
A. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
1. NAFTA Preamble
The preamble of NAFTA sets the environmental tone of the agreement.2 7 Out
of fifteen preambular statements, three relate to the environment or sustainable
development. 2' Despite this stated commitment to the environment, the general
principles of the preamble are unenforceable.29 Moreover, NAFTA critics readily
22. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integra-
tion, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900 (1996-1997).
23. See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 6, at 66.
24. Id.
25. Id. (quoting Steve Charnovitz, NAFTA 's Social Dimension: Lessons from the Past and Frame-
work for the Future, 8 INT'L TRADE J. 39 (1994)). Charnovitz states, "[t]he bottom line is that the
NAFTA has no positive provisions (i.e. telling governments what to do) on the environment. What
it has is one negative exhortation. More significant is what is largely absent from the NAFTA, i.e.
negative disciplines (telling governments what not to do) on environmental standards." Id. at 66
n.4.
26. Id. at 66.
27. NAFTA, supra note 5, 32 I.L.H. at 297.
28. JAMES R. HOLBEIN & DONALD J. MUSCH, NAFTA FINAL TEXT: SUMMARY, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY & IMPLEMENTATION DIRECTORY 107 (1994). In the preamble to the NAFTA, the govern-
ments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States resolve to "UNDERTAKE each of the preceding
in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation," "PROMOTE sustainable
development," and "STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations." Id. See also NAFTA, supra note 5, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
29. See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 6, at 67. Additionally, experience with previous
trade agreements has shown that preambular language will rarely be used by dispute settlement panels
to interpret other provisions of NAFTA. Id. This language, however, should not be taken lightly.
SPRING 1998
156 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
point out that environmental protection goes unmentioned in the enumeration of
NAFTA's basic objectives.3"
2. Text of NAFTA
In addition to the preamble, environment-related stipulations are found in four
other provisions of NAFTA.3' Article 104 recognizes the legitimacy of other
international environmental agreements.32 This provision states:
[i]n the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade obliga-
tions set out in ... [lists the relevant environmental agreements] such obligations shall
prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that where a party has a choice among
equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such obligations, the
Party chooses the alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of
this Agreement. 33
Article 104 not only allows international environmental agreements already
in existence to prevail over NAFTA, but also allows for the parties to amend
the provision to include any new environmental agreements.34 NAFTA provides
two separate chapters on environmental standards.35 Chapter Seven sets forth the
criteria for domestic sanitary and phytosanitary measures.6 These measures are
defined as "measures to protect animal, plant, or human life in the party's territory
from the risks associated with a [plant-borne or animal-borne] pest or disease
released into the environment or with the presence of an additive, contaminant,
toxin, or disease-causing organism in a food, beverage, or feedstuff. "" Chapter
Nine outlines the general test for all other standards-related measures including
environmental norms. 38 This chapter sets out the basic rights and obligations of
NAFTA parties with respect to environmental and labor standards. 39 Article
904(2) provides that "each Party may, in pursuing its legitimate objectives of
safety or the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment
Under the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, preambular language can be used
as a source of international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). The
United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention. Id.
30. HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 109. NAFTA's objectives, listed in Article 102,
include inter alia eliminating trade barriers, promoting fair competition, substantially increasing
investment opportunities in the parties' territories, establishing a framework for further trilateral
cooperation, and creating procedures for the resolution of disputes. Id.
31. See generally NAFTA, supra note 5, 32 I.L.M. 289.
32. Id. at 297.
33. Id. at 297-98.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 368, 386.
36. See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 6, at 70.
37. Id. at 70 n. 16.
38. Michael E. Arruda, Effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement on Trade Between
the United States and Mexico in the Energy and Petrochemical Industries, I TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 191, 221 (1994).
39. Id.
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or consumers, establish the levels of protection that it considers appropriate." 40
"Although this Article allows each party to adopt standards that result in a higher
level of protection than international standards, it leaves significant discretion
with each party to determine its 'appropriate' level of protection." 4 In contrast
to this discretion to adopt "appropriate" levels of environmental protection,
article 1114 is the pollution haven investment clause.42 This article recognizes
that "it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health,
safety or environmental measures. "4 Article 1114 provides, in part, "[n]othing
in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining
or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a
manner sensitive to environmental concerns.""
The final provision dealing with the environment is article 2015. 4' This provi-
sion falls under Chapter 20, section B, dealing with formal dispute resolution.'
It allows the arbitral panel to request a written report of a scientific review board
on any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety, or other scientific
matters raised by a disputing party .4' All environmental language contained in
NAFTA can be found in one of these four provisions.
B. THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
In addition to the environmental provisions contained in the text of NAFTA,
the three countries signed the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation [NAAEC] .48 This side agreement was a direct manifestation of the
debates surrounding the enactment of NAFTA. 49 The NAAEC, however, is an
independent document and its negotiation and adoption did not change the text
of NAFTA in any way. 50 "The NAAEC recognizes and addresses the interrela-
tionship between trade and the environment." 5' It is important, however, to
40. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 904(2).
41. Arruda, supra note 38, at 221.
42. HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 354.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 481.
46. Id. at 474-81.
47. Id. at 481.
48. Id. at 966. See also North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between
the Government of the United States, the Government of Canada, and the Government of the United
Mexican States, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. The side agreement also
became effective on January 1, 1994. HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 966. See also NAAEC,
art. 47.
49. See generally BLOCK & HERRUP, supra note 11, at 226-28.
50. JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 6, at 123. "The intergovernmental environmental side-
agreement would have to stand on its own." Id.
51. Ann Bivona, What Price Are We Willing to Pay for Our Environment?, 5 J. INT'L L. &
PRAC. 161 (1996).
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recognize that the NAAEC contains "no specific protective measures, environ-
mental standards, codes, or substantive rules." 52 Rather, it creates a mechanism
to deal with environmental problems that arise from the existing policies of the
member nations and the problems that arise as a result of NAFTA.53 The NAAEC
is intended to harmonize economic growth with the protection of the environment
by preventing the acquisition of a competitive trade advantage through the failure
to enforce or enact environmental legislation.1
4
1. The Commission on Environmental Cooperation
The NAAEC created the North American Commission on Environmental Coop-
eration (CEC).55 The CEC is endowed with a "continental environmental coopera-
tion mandate that touches upon the ecological impacts of NAFTA but also extends
well beyond the implications of liberalized trade." 56 The NAAEC also creates a
dispute settlement mechanism that addresses complaints by one party about the
quality of the domestic administrations and enforcement of environmental protec-
tion schemes of another party." Thus, the goal of the CEC is to enhance cooperation
between member parties while providing a dispute resolution mechanism.5"
The CEC was established, in part, to address the concern that "Mexico's histori-
cally weak and inconsistent enforcement of environmental laws would be unable to
cope with the expected increase in economic activity-and the resulting pollution-
flowing from free trade throughout Mexico." 59 As a short-term goal, the CEC can
be expected to encourage Mexico to enforce more vigorously its domestic environ-
mental standards. 60 "In the longer term, a vigorous CEC could lead to the improved
administrative and judicial institutions and to amelioration of the environmental
consequences of accelerated development in Mexico ...- 6' Further, "the CEC
offers the promise of integrated North American environmental planning on a num-
ber of regional fronts and could . . . yield environmental benefits for all parties
beyond the area of international trade." 62 "By having such goals, people of each
country are reassured that their government will maintain and provide a high level
of environmental protection." 63
52. JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 6, at 128. "Like most international law, the side agreement
steers clear of the normative realm and concerns itself with institutional things, primarily because
it is the product of an intergovernmental process between entities that each want to set their own
standards." Id.
53. Bivona, supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 6, at 126.
57. See generally HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 941-1008.
58. Bivona, supra note 51.
59. Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, Environmental Law: Implementation of NAFTA,




63. Bivona, supra note 51, at 165.
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a. CEC Structure
The NAAEC establishes a three-part structure for the CEC consisting of
(1) the Council; (2) an independent Secretariat; and (3) a Joint Advisory Commit-
tee.' The Council is comprised of cabinet-level representatives from the member
countries and is to meet at least once a year. 65 The Council chooses the executive
Director for the independent Secretariat.66 The Director serves for a three-year
term, to which he/she may be re-elected once.67 The Secretariat's staff is chosen
by the Director, subject to a two-thirds vote by the Council. Finally, the Joint
Committee is comprised of fifteen members chosen by each party .68 Its function
is to advise the Council on matters pertaining to the NAAEC. 69
b. Claims and Relief
The NAAEC mandates to the CEC broad powers to report on enforcement
matters and encourage the parties to enforce laws.7° Despite this, the CEC's
power is limited. 7' "A private person or non-governmental organization (NGO)
may institute a claim before the Secretariat charging that a party is engaged in
a practice of not enforcing its environmental laws. 72 Although a private party
or NGO has the ability to bring such a claim, relief is limited.73 The maximum
relief available for a claim by a private citizen or NGO is the Secretariat's submis-
sion of a factual report to the council, which will be made public only if two-thirds
of the Council members agree.74
Unlike a private party or NGO, "each of the state parties has the ability to
initiate and, if necessary, carry through to an enforceable decision a claim that
another party's conduct evidences a 'persistent pattern of failure. . . to effectively
enforce its environmental law.' ," Under the side agreement, the process for
a claim begins with the complaining party engaging in consultation with the
other party.76 If such consultations do not lead to a resolution of the matter, the
64. HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 946-49. See also NAAEC, supra note 48, art. 9.
65. HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 946.
66. Id. at 949.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 954.
69. Id.
70. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 59.
71. Id.
72. Id. See generally HOLBEIN & HUSCH, supra note 28.
73. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 59.
74. Id. See also HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 949-50. Moreover, the complaining party
or NGO will face a number of obstacles to obtain even that relief. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 59.
The Secretariat is given broad discretion to determine whether the complaint merits
a response; if the matter complained of is the subject of any pending judicial or
administrative domestic proceeding, the Secretariat must proceed no further on the
claim; and the Secretariat may not even prepare a factual record unless the council,
by two-thirds vote, instructs it to do so.
Id.
75. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 59. See also HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, § B, at 952.
76. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 59.
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complaining party is to present its complaint to the Council. 77 The Council may
call in experts, issue recommendations, or propose conciliation, mediation, or
other dispute resolution mechanisms.78 If this does not lead to a resolution, the
Council can then submit the complaint to arbitration before a five-member panel .7
The members of that arbitral panel are to be chosen by the parties from a roster
of qualified arbitrators appointed by the Council. 0 The arbitration panel then
decides if there has been a persistent failure; if so, it issues an "action plan"
to remedy the pattern of nonenforcement."' "If a party fails to implement the
action plan as directed, the panel may impose a monetary penalty of up to $20
million (in year 1 of the CEC) or 0.007 percent of the total annual trade in goods
between the disputing parties (in following years)." 2
Despite the ability of a complaining state to obtain an enforceable judgment
through an arbitral panel, some problems exist with this method of dispute resolu-
tion.83 For example, the arbitral panel's jurisdiction is limited to claims involving
the nonenforcement of environmental laws relating to" 'workplaces, firms, com-
panies or sectors' that 'produce goods or provide services' that are either traded
between the parties or that compete, in the territory of the party complained against,
with the goods produced or services provided by persons of another party.'"4
C. NAAEC PARTY COMMITMENTS
Beyond the CEC remedies, the NAAEC contains a number of commitments
by the parties to improve their domestic legal procedures in order to enhance
environmental enforcement. 85 Article 5 of the NAAEC states that each party
shall take appropriate governmental action to ensure the enforcement of its envi-
ronmental laws and regulations.86 This commitment is limited, however, because
"[a] party will not ... be deemed to have failed to 'effectively enforce' its
environmental laws if its action or inaction 'reflects a reasonable exercise of
...discretion' or is the result of the government's 'bona fide decisions' regarding






82. Id. "If Canada fails to pay the penalty, enforcement penalty may be sought in its domestic
courts; if Mexico or the U.S. fails to comply, the aggrieved party may suspend NAFTA benefits
to the non-paying party in an amount equal to the penalty." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28.
86. Id. at 944. See also NAAEC, supra note 48, art. 5.
87. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 59. The article lists various forms of appropriate governmental
action, including: training inspectors and providing for government search and seizure rights; promot-
ing environmental audits; recordkeeping and reporting; publicly releasing noncompliance informa-
tion; controlling pollution through licenses, permits or authorizations; and timely initiation of adminis-
trative or judicial proceeding to seek remedies and sanctions for violations. Id.
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Article 6(1) of the NAAEC states: "[e]ach Party shall ensure that interested
persons may request the Party's competent authorities to investigate alleged viola-
tions of its environmental laws and regulations and shall give such requests due
consideration in accordance with law.""8 It further states in article 6(2) that
"[e]ach Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under
its law in a particular matter have appropriate access to administrative, quasi-
judicial or judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the Party's environmental
laws and regulations.- 8 9 The article suggests that access to the appropriate forums
includes the right both to seek damages and to request enforcement of environmen-
tal laws in order to protect the environment.
Article 7 of the NAAEC requires parties to ensure that their administrative,
quasi-judicial, and judicial proceedings are fair, open, and equitable. 9' "To that
end, parties must ensure due process, public access, and the right of parties to the
proceedings to support or defend their positions. The article requires written, rea-
soned and appealable decisions that are made available to the parties and are'consis-
tent with its law.' "9' Thus, the environmental goals of NAFTA and the NAAEC
will be sought through two instruments: new institutions to foster trilateral environ-
mental co-operations and new environmental obligations for the signatories.93
II. The Pre-adoption Debate
Prior to the adoption of NAFTA, a heated debate arose in the United States
concerning the environmental impacts of increased trade and the dramatic growth
of industry between the three NAFTA countries.94 Indeed, both advocates and
opponents of the agreement clung to the environment as a support for their posi-
tions.95 The debate prompted Canada, Mexico, and the United States to sign
the supplemental North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
[NAAEC] late in the summer of 1993.96
A. ADVOCATES OF NAFTA: PREDICTIONS FOR THE AGREEMENT
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
During the 1993 debate over NAFTA, U.S. political and corporate proponents
made numerous promises in an attempt to pass the trade agreement through the
88. HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 944. See also NAAEC, supra note 48, art. 6.
89. HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 945.
90. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 59. Neither NAFTA, nor the side agreement, however, explicitly
expands Mexico's narrow criteria for standing. See generally HOLBEIN & MUScH, supra note 28.
91. HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 945. See also NAAEC, supra note 48, art. 7.
92. Kass & Gerrard, supra note 59.
93. See generally HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28.
94. See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11.
95. See generally Non-Trade Related Issues: Environment, 3 MEX. TRADE & L. REP., Nov.
1993 at 9; PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11, at i-ii; Block & Herrup, supra note 11, at 223-28.
96. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11, at 53.
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U.S. Congress.97 The promises were impressive in both their number and their
scope.98 If Congress were to pass NAFTA, the proponents argued generally,
there would be an increase in jobs, wages would rise, the environment . . . would
improve, relations between the peoples of North America would be enhanced, illegal
drug trafficking between NAFTA nations would be reduced, enforcement of each na-
tion's labor and environmental laws would be strengthened, illegal immigration would
decrease, and the list went on. 99
The environmental promises made by the proponents of NAFTA were particularly
compelling.o
President Clinton predicted the environmental impact of NAFTA in a Depart-
ment of State dispatch.'°' This dispatch stated:
[w]e are working to clean up the border through a $1 billion environmental plan. We
are working together on water treatment projects from California to Texas. We are
cooperating to fight air pollution. The supplemental environmental cooperation
agreement will oversee enforcement of environmental laws, bring environmental con-
cerns into the making of trade policy, and give us a framework for a comprehensive
North American approach to the environment. 102
Clinton praised Mexico for its recent commitment to environmental issues. 1
03
He stated that, from 1990 to 1993, President Salinas quadrupled the number of
officials enforcing the environmental laws along the border. 10 4 In 1991, to cut
air pollution in Mexico City, Salinas ordered an oil refinery to close that accounted
for 7 percent of Mexico's refining capacity. 105 Thus, the Clinton administration
predicted that the trade agreement, coupled with Mexico's recently found commit-
ment to environmental policies, would strengthen the environment of North
America. 106
Advocates of free trade argued that the "trickle down" effect of economic
growth will improve environmental conditions.' 7 NAFTA proponents touted
NAFTA as the panacea for the health and environmental problems occurring in
border free trade zones and that without NAFTA, these problems would continue
to grow. 08 In addition, proponents argued that increased prosperity in Mexico




101. NAFTA AND THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 8.




106. Id. at 5.
107. Jeffrey A. Mello, The Environmental Cost of Free Trade, Bus. & Soc'v REV., Sept. 22,
1994.
108. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11, at i. "If NAFTA were implemented, they argued, the
concentration of industries in the border, and thus industrial pollution and human population would
lessen, reducing the strain on the environment and the massively overburdened border infrastructure."
Id.
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would result from NAFTA.' 09 This prosperity would raise Mexico's standard of
living and thus result in a spending increase for environmental clean up. 0 Finally,
proponents argued that "the new environmental institutions that were to be created
parallel to NAFTA would provide the funding and oversight to organize large
scale environmental clean up and improvements to the infrastructure, as well as
ensuring strong environmental law enforcement."".. Because of the international
attention centered around the agreement, NAFTA advocates predicted that both
the U.S. and Mexican governments would, at a minimum, rank as a top priority
the investment necessary to remedy high profile problems. "2
B. OPPOSITION TO NAFTA: PREDICTIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
CAUSED BY NAFTA
The opponents of NAFTA saw the environmentally devastated border zone,
brought about by the maquiladora program, as an example of the effects of
free trade. "3 They argued that in contrast to hopes that NAFTA would improve
conditions, NAFTA would cause further devastation along the border and eventu-
ally spread these problems throughout Mexico.' " Opponents argued that in-
creased investments in Mexico, absent an improvement in environmental stan-
dards and enforcement, would cause a general downturn in North America's
environmental and health standards. "' They further argued, "[i]ncreased trade
under NAFTA. . . would not necessarily lead to increased prosperity for NAFTA
nations and would be more likely to lead to a 'race for the bottom' in wages and
living standards." "
6
Environmentalists argued businesses would flock to Mexico due to their lax
enforcement of environmental laws."17 In addition to environmental costs, the
cost of noncompliance is a related variable that businesses consider when relocat-
ing. "' Mexico, however, "does not have a strict liability standard for environmen-
tal damage nor is Mexico known for any type of aggressive enforcement of its









117. Mello, supra note 107. See also Bivona, supra note 51. "The NAFTA contains language
in an attempt to address this concern." Id. at 174. The pollution haven investment clause seeks to
ensure that environmental measures are not relaxed in an effort to attract investment. Id.
118. Mello, supra note 107. U.S. laws such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act [CERCLA] and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
[RCRA] impose strict liability on businesses involved either directly or indirectly in the release of
hazardous substances into the environment. Id.
119. Id.
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alone cannot be cited as the only factor accounting for industry migration, oppo-
nents claim a greater incentive for industry to migrate across the Mexican border
exists because the percentage of operating costs assumed by environmental costs
in the United States has risen. 2 0
Opponents also argued that the maquiladora program established along the
U.S.-Mexican border has been an environmental disaster. 12 "The maquiladora
program was initially designed to avoid the potentially high unemployment re-
sulting from the cancellation of the United States Bracero Program in which
Mexican workers were provided with seasonal farmwork within the United
States.''22 In an attempt to minimize transportation costs, most maquiladora
plants have been located in close proximity to the U.S.-Mexican border. 123 The
location of the plants has caused border areas to become overpopulated with
industry and laborers without the necessary infrastructure to support these
changes. 124 The numerous public health and environmental concerns that have
arisen due to the increased industrial base and rapid population growth have been
"compounded by the fact that the border region generally lacks environmental
funding, regulation, and enforcement by the Mexican government." 1 25 Opponents
feared that given the environmental degradation that resulted from the maquila-
dora program, Mexico's lax environmental standards will pressure the United
States into lowering its own standards.
26
Other arguments against NAFTA and the NAAEC dealt specifically with the
text and environmental provisions of the agreement. 27 Opponents argued the
dispute resolution process set up under NAFTA is not sufficient.
28
[E]nvironmentalists complain that the process is secretive, exclusive, and lacks provi-
sions for enforcement .... [T]here is no apparent means to allow for public comment
on the matters presented before the panels. In addition, no specific trade sanctions are
provided as a means to combat noncompliance with the provisions of either NAFTA
120. Id.
121. Id. "The Mexican maquiladora program allows foreign-owned companies to create manufac-






126. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11, at ii.
ITlhe NAFTA does not threaten the validity of the United States federal and state
environmental regulations. Unlike many trade agreements, there is language within
this agreement designed to govern the validity of high national environmental standards,
even when these are more stringent than the international standards. The NAFTA will
uphold each countries' standards, provided they are more stringent. No country
... will be required to grant entry of a product into their territory if it fails to meet
that territory's standards.
Bivona, supra note 51, at 175.
127. Mello, supra note 107.
128. Id.
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or the side agreement on the environment. What is mentioned relative to sanctions is
considered to be unenforceable and too complex to be of much use.
29
Thus, opponents of the free trade agreement argue that it contains inadequate
dispute resolution mechanisms. 30
Opponents further criticized the dispute resolution process of NAFTA and the
side agreement because of the burden of proof standard."'3 "Under NAFTA the
burden of proof rests with the challenging party to establish that the sanitary
(health) or phytosanitary (plant health) measure in question is inconsistent with
or in violation of NAFTA." '132 Although the treaty allows each party to adopt
stricter measures than its partners, those measures could be challenged as inconsis-
tent with NAFTA.
33
The criticisms that NAFTA and the NAAEC lacks adequate dispute resolution
procedures and that there is a problem with the burden of proof standard are
interrelated.' "Even once a country claims a 'persistent pattern of failure to
enforce environmental laws' against a trading partner not only will the environ-
mental damage already have been done and compounded through repeat offenses,
the burden of proof will still fall on the accusing party."1 35 Also, the CEC consists
of one member from each country. 136 Canada does not favor trade sanctions, and
Mexico is unlikely to vote for sanctions against its own country. 37 Thus, the
CEC does not function as an environmental police force, and the complaint
process will proceed only if the CEC finds the complaint valid against a trading
partner. 
31
Similarly, environmental concerns have been beaten out by free trade under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 131 "NAFTA represents the first time
environmental issues have been considered simultaneously with trade policies and
clearly establishes a very important precedent for future trade negotiations. "'40
But there are several major problems.
Despite the green language in NAFTA, environmental concerns can be chal-
lenged if believed to be inconsistent with free trade principles. 14' As mentioned








136. See generally HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28.




141. See generally HOLBEIN & MUSCH,'supra note 28.
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when they conflict with free trade principles. 142 Thus, although it is uncertain
whether the environmental provisions in NAFTA will hold up, a pattern for their
failure has been established.
43
Opponents further argued that the environmental provisions of NAFTA con-
tained vague and permissive language.'44 "While the fourth provision states that
the 'NAFTA countries will work jointly to enhance the protection of human,
animal, and plant life and health and the environment,' guidelines such as this
are meaningless if they fail to address any specific standard for behavior. -41
For example, provision five of NAFTA prohibits any NAFTA country from
lowering its environmental standards to attract investment. 146 Yet, provision two
"affirms the right of each country to choose the level of protection of human,
animal, or plant life or health or of environmental protection that it considers
appropriate." 47 Thus, short of using environmental standards to bait investment,
NAFTA permits each country to adopt the agreement's vague environmental
provisions on its own terms, under its own interpretations. 14
The fact that NAFTA provides no conditional safeguards by which environmen-
tal concerns can be protected is another problem that the opponents find objection-
able. 149 For example, if Mexico decided on a level of environmental protection
that was not only below that of the United States, but also resulted in externalities
through air and water pollution that extended across the border (or worse if Mexico
142. Mello, supra note 107. The right to adopt environmental and labor standard-related measures
includes the right to ban imports of nonconforming goods or services under Article 9 of NAFTA.
NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 9. No party, however, may adopt such a measure with the intent or
effect of creating an "unnecessary obstacle to trade between the [NAFTA] Parties." Id. art. 904(4).
Under article 905, each country agrees to use international standards as the basis for its own standard-
related measures "except where such standards would be an ineffective or inappropriate means to
fulfill its legitimate objectives." Id. art. 905. Although this article allows each party to adopt standards
that result in a higher level of protection than international standards, it leaves significant discretion
to each party to determine its "appropriate" level of protection. Mello, supra 107. For example,
in 1990, the U.S. EPA's prohibition on the use and importation of asbestos caused Canada to challenge
such regulation as a restraint on trade. Id. The authorities administering GATT agreed with Canada
that not all types of asbestos are equally harmful and that EPA regulations did serve as a restraint
on trade. Id. In 1991, Mexico challenged the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act, which prohibits
the import of tuna that had been caught in nets that also kill dolphins. Id. When Mexico complained
to GATT that this was an illegal trade barrier, the GATT commission agreed. Id. Mexico did not
pursue the matter, perhaps in preparation for the adoption of NAFTA. Id. The European Union has
since brought similar charges against the United States with a ruling pending. Id. Several E.U.
countries complained that U.S. pesticide laws effectively banned wine exports to the United States
because wines contain a slight chemical residue. Id. The EPA was politically pressured to quickly
set a temporary chemical limit to allow these wine imports even though the full review required by
U.S. law had not been completed. Id.
143. Mello, supra note 107.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. HOLaEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28.
147. Mello, supra note 107.
148. NAFTA, supra note 5. See also Mello, supra note 107.
149. Mello, supra note 107.
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agreed to environmental standards and then reneged on enforcing those standards),
NAFTA does not provide for any trade sanctions that would require Mexico to
live up to its environmental commitments or to the environmental standards of its
trading partners that are being violated due to border proximities. 150 Even though
a country is prohibited from lowering its environmental standards to attract invest-
ment, provision five provides no sanction for doing so.' 5 '
Although the Mexican government has taken some steps towards enforcing
its environmental policies, opponents argued that these steps were insufficient. 1
5 2
The Mexican government pledged $466 million in 1992 to help clean up the
border area's pollution problems under the Integrated Border Environmental Plan
(IBEP), but opponents argued that there is no guarantee that Mexico will be able
to meet this pledged funding. '53 Further, NAFTA offers no guarantee that Mexico
will experience economic growth or that any resulting economic growth will
result in improvements to the environment. 154
Despite pledges for funding and the mandate under IBEP that SEDSOL (Mexi-
co's environmental enforcement agency) and the EPA increase cooperation, incen-
tives for environmental compliance are conspicuously absent. 5 5 Opponents of
NAFTA argue that the Mexican government has no incentives to comply with the
NAFTA environmental provisions since the United States is left without the ability
to subject Mexico to trade sanctions. '56 In addition, they argue NAFTA does "little
to reduce the uncertainty concerning Mexico's treatment of the environment be-
cause the United States lacks the ability to either force Mexico to observe specific
mandated NAFTA provisions or to unilaterally impose trade sanctions. 15
Finally, NAFTA opponents argue the agreement lacks incentives for individual
companies to comply with environmental regulations.158 The prerequisite that
there be "a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce environmental
laws" is directed at governments, not at individual businesses.' 59 Action can only
be taken against individual companies by the government of the nation in which the
company conducts its pollution operations. "6 Furthermore, "NAFTA requires a.
record, history, or persistent pattern of failure by governments to enforce their
laws so not only are single violations apparently not actionable under the persistent
pattern requirement of NAFTA but the actions of individual companies are not
150. Id.
151. NAFTA, supra note 5. See also Mello, supra note 107.
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under the jurisdiction of NAFTA.- 1 6 ' Thus, NAFTA provides no avenue of
redress for the government of one party against the private industry of another
party located within its borders. 1
62
III. Post NAFTA Adoption Realities
A. POSITIVE EFFECT OF NAFTA ON MEXICO's ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Even if U.S. exports to Mexico do not increase as a result of NAFTA, the
U.S.-style of interventionist government has taken root in Mexico as a direct
result of the treaty. 61 Mexico's few cost advantages in international trade have
been threatened by NAFTA's environmental policies.'6 Before becoming a signa-
tory, Mexico was pressured to enact U.S.-style laws for hazardous waste, trans-
portation, forestry, fisheries, soil, and water standards. 65
1. The EEPA
In preparation for NAFTA negotiations, Mexico adopted its first comprehen-
sive environmental law.'66 In 1988, Mexico enacted the Law of Ecological Equi-
librium and Environmental Protection Act (EEPA) which regulated air, water,
soil, and the use of natural resources. 67 The EEPA has stringent provisions that
parallel those in the United States and is enforced under the auspices of the
Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESO), which serves a capacity in Mexico
similar to that served by the EPA in the United States. 68 The EEPA, however,
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. James Sheenan, Birthday Blues for NAFTA, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1995, at Al.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Laura J. Van Pelt, Countervailing Environmentel Subsidies: A Solution to the Environmental
Inequities of the North America Free Trade Agreement, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 123, 132.
[Iln 1988 Mexico enacted a comprehensive environmental law, the Ley General del
Equilibrio Ecologico y la Proteccion al Ambiente (EEPA). EEPA, which covers air,
water, soil, hazardous waste, nuclear energy, and natural resources, sets up a frame-
work for environmental law in Mexico, but leaves the formation of specific directives
to the Secretary of Social Development (SEDESOL).
Id. at 132-33 (citing TEXAS CTR. FOR POLICY STUDIES, A RESPONSE TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLAN FOR FREE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH MEXICO 13 (1991). "In 1992,
the Secretary of Urban and Ecological Development (SEDUE), the former Mexican environmental
agency, was consolidated with other government social programs into SEDESOL." Id. at 133 n.93
(citing TEXAS CTR. FOR POLICY STUDIES, NAFTA AND THE U.S./MExIco BORDER ENVIRONMENT:
OPTIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1992)).
167. Id. at 133.
168. Id. "A great deal of Mexican environmental law is modeled on United States law. For
example, Mexico's hazardous waste regulations are based upon the 'cradle to grave' tracking concept
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [(RCRA)]." Id. Detailing the parallels, commentators
state:
Mexico's federal environmental agency has adopted complex hazardous waste regula-
tions. . . . The regulations are patterned after those promulgated by the United States
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA]. In addition to requiring
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has been only sporadically enforced.169 Critics argue that the EEPA fails to deter
the kind of behavior it is designed to prevent due to an insufficient allocation of
funds for enforcement. 
70
In addition to upgrading its environmental policies prior to signing NAFTA,
Mexico has added more environmental regulations.' 7' ,,Since the adoption of the
NAFTA, the Mexican government has issued a number of standards, including
37 water standards, 53 on atmospheric emissions, 19 on hazardous waste, four
on environmental impacts, eight on risk management, 20 on transportation of
hazardous materials, and 87 on safety and hygiene.'
72
2. The Side Agreements
In 1996, as required by the side agreements, a tri-national panel consisting of
numerous experts met in San Diego to prepare an environmental study of the
all generators to submit an inventory of hazardous wastes, these regulations mandate
testing and characterization of hazardous wastes, use of manifests in the shipment of
hazardous wastes, governmental authorization of hazardous waste transporters and
disposal facilities, and notification to federal authorities in the event of spills of hazard-
ous wastes.
Id. at 133 n.96 (citing Paul C. Nightingale& Gregory A. Bibler, Environmental Law in Latin America,
12 Int'l Env't Rep. Current Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 507 (Oct. 11, 1989)).
169. Id. at 133.
As in the United States, these legal requirements are only obeyed when there is a
threat of enforcement, and they are only enforced when adequate funding for manpower
and resources is available. To date, adequate funding has not been available in Mexico.
The Mexican government, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and regional environmental groups estimate that only slightly more than half of U.S.
maquiladora plants comply with Mexican hazardous waste disposal regulations. Re-
sponding to their lack of manpower, Mexican authorities in the past have attempted
to entice voluntary compliance by promising not to inspect the plants for one or two
years if the plant managers agreed to meet certain milestones toward compliance.
Id. at 133.
170. Mello, supra note 107. For example, for years three inspectors were responsible for the
oversight of 650 maquiladora facilities, as well as an additional number of domestic factories in the
Tijuana area. Id. Estimates are that only one in 20 industrial facilities in the Tijuana area would
pass the EEPA environmental standards. Id. In 1990, a nationwide study estimated that only 30%
of the approximately 1000 maquiladora plants generating hazardous waste had complied with the
EEPA's reporting (as opposed to operating) requirements. Id. The study concluded further that only
19% of the maquiladoras properly disposed of the waste they generated. Id. Mexican environmental
law falls short of U.S. law in the area of public participation in the policy-making process and public
monitoring of both polluters and the government. Michael S. Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental
Considerations of the Emerging United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 259, 286-287 (1992). Mexico currently lacks "community right-to-know" laws that allow
the public to monitor industrial compliance. Id. at 286. In addition, Mexico does not require the
examination of alternative actions, nor does it provide opportunities for public comment on projects
that may have a significant impact on the environment. Id. Finally, Mexican citizens cannot currently
bring actions against Mexican industries or government for noncompliance with environmental laws.
Id.
171. Bivona, supra note 51, at 177.
172. Id. at 177 n. 131 (citing International Trade, Mexican Financial Crisis Said to Threaten
Environmental Spending Prompted by NAFTA, Daily Reports for Executives (The Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc.) No. 57, at D-17 (Mar. 24, 1995).
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impacts of the first few years of NAFTA. 173 The effort represents one of the first
under any of the world's trade agreements to try to calculate the effect that
increases in trade and investment have on the environment of participating
nations. "'
The NAAEC created two bi-national agencies to oversee and fund environmen-
tal cleanup efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border. 175 The two agencies started
slowly, struggling to create agency rules and regulations, filling their bi-national
boards, and choosing directors.176 One agency created by the side agreement is
the Border Environmental Cooperation Committee (BEEC). The BEEC retains
the power to decide which projects receive funding, and the North American
Development Bank (NADBank), which has $750 million in lending capacity from
the United States and Mexico, loans the money to the affected communities to
repay the projects. 177 Critics say, "the process is flawed because it requires poor
communities to repay loans to the NADBank, thereby excluding worthwhile
projects that aren't moneymaking ventures.' 178
Although steady, progress on the NAAEC's implementation has been slow.1
79
Mexico has focused its attention on immediate economic issues to the detriment
of environmental priorities.' 80 Nonetheless, the NAAEC and its emphasis on
public participation has positively impacted environmental policy in Mexico.1
Public participation goals have been included in President Zedillo's environmental
platform as well as the recent decree reorganizing environmental, fisheries, and
natural resource management functions at the federal level. 182
In addition to the slow progress of the side agreement's implementation, Mexico
has been hampered by an economic crisis and can not pay its debts, much less
come up with new money for the environment. 183 "The United States is spending
hundreds of millions but the task can't be done by one nation." 8 4 The EPA said
that up to $8 billion would be available in loans and grants from the World Bank
and other international lenders for cleanup projects over ten years.' 85 In addition,
173. Diane Lindquist, 3 Nations Fine-tune Study of NAFTA, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 1,
1996, at C2.
174. Id.
175. HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28, at 1009.
176. Pamela Hartman, NAFTA Doesn't Slow Border Pollution as Mexico's Economy Crumbles,
Money Dwindles to Enforce Its Environmental Laws, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 18, 1996, at 6A.
177. Id.
178. Id.




183. Nancy Nusser, NAFTA No Panacea for Border Pollution. U.S. -Mexican Cleanup a Yet-to-Be-
Kept Treaty Promise. Money Problems: Mexico Can't Pay Its Debts, Much Less Fork Over Resources
for the Environment, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 24, 1995, at G08.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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the EPA stated that Mexico would spend $3 billion from one fund between 1994
and 1996.186 As of yet, however, Mexico has drawn only a few million dollars. 1
87
Despite the economic crisis, environmental compliance in Mexico has improved
in recent years.18  Furthermore, "enforcement activities will continue unabated
to the extent that resources allow.'
189
By 1994, Canada, the United States, and Mexico had adopted NAFTA with
its two newly negotiated side agreements. 190 Just recently, however, the environ-
mental agreement might have finally had some effect.' 9' In August of 1996, the
environmental ministers of the three countries ordered an investigation into a
controversial tourism project in Mexico,' 92 thus launching the first test of environ-
mental provisions contained in the agreement. 193 Sergio Marchi, the Canadian
Environmental Minister for the CEC, stated that the "decision 'speaks to the
credibility and seriousness' of the commission."94
Despite this initial test of the environmental provisions, the Commission has
no enforcement powers of its own. 19 5 "In a case like this, it can only inquire,
report-and embarrass offending governments. -196 Despite the lack of sanction
power, this test could determine if NAFTA's environmental language will have
any effect on government actions.' 97
B. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF NAFTA ON MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
NAFTA supporters promised environmental regulation in Mexico through
NAFTA.' 98 Although Mexico has passed some new environmental regulations, it
has eliminated or changed some as well. 99 "In October [of 1995] the government
changed regulations so new factories will not have to file environmental impact
statements aimed at controlling industrial pollution. Instead, most new factories
will file a prevention plan that spells out their effect on the environment in much
looser terms."200 The side agreement has no bite; it merely states a series of
principles and creates an oversight committee with representatives from each
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Edward Hoyt, Mexico Vows Continued Enforcement of Environmental Regulation, 5 U.S.
MEX. FREE TRADE REP. No. 8, Apr. 30, 1995.
189. Id.
190. See generally HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 28.
191. A Vital Test: Dispute over the Future of a Fragile Coral Reef in Mexico Will Determine the
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country, but the CEC can only make recommendations, with no power to enforce
them.2 °'
Proponents of NAFTA promised increased investment in environmental
cleanup throughout Mexico; 2°2 this in turn would lead to a decline in the concentra-
tion of maquiladoras along the U.S.-Mexico border.0 3 Unfortunately, there has
been no improvement in the disposal of wastes or of health care facilities. °4 In
fact, "[m]any communities still lack access to both water and sewage systems." 20 5
In addition, NAFTA's environmental threats reach beyond the border region.2"6
As discussed earlier, environmental standards can be challenged as "nontariff
trade barriers." 20 7 If these standards are challenged, they will have to be justified
based on a risk assessment analysis. A risk assessment analysis would focus on
whether the health risks incurred because of lower standards are great enough to
justify the cost of the restrictions on trade.208 Unfortunately, risk assessment usually
leads to the lowest restrictions on businesses at the expense of the environment.2 0°9
The progress of the institutions designed to deal with the environmental issues
under NAFTA has been disparaging. 2'0 The NADBank has been slow to provide
funding to any project involving environmental cleanup.2 1' The CEC, which was
designed to ensure high levels of environmental protection and foster public
discussion, has received few petitions, almost all of which have been rejected. 212
One critic of the CEC stated:
[diuring its first year of operation, BECC did little more than alienate environmental
activists on both sides of the border by holding closed-door meetings, restricting public
input to the commission, and announcing that it would consider a list of projects put
forward by the Mexican government before any process for public submissions had
been established.2 13
Thus, progress has been slow at best.2' 4
The CEC controls enforcement aspects of the side agreement.2' 5 During its
201. Id.
202. Sarah Anderson et al., NAFTA-Trinational Fiasco: Remember the Rosy Promises About
Jobs, Etc? Here's the Reality Check, THE NATION, July 15, 1996, at 26.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. Today, only 10% of Mexico's yearly output of seven million tons of hazardous waste
receives adequate treatment, with the rest poured into clandestine waste dumps or municipal sewers.
Id.
206. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11.
207. Anderson et al, supra note 202.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 5.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. David Bacon, After NAFTA, ENV'T. ACTION MAG., Sept. 1, 1995, at 33.
214. Id.
215. NAAEC, supra note 48, pt. 7, art. 50. Governments, NGOs, and individuals may make
complaints, but complaints can only be filed concerning the failure by a government to enforce its
own environmental laws. Id.
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first year, the CEC accepted no complaints.21 6 The first complaint was filed in
the spring of 1995.2I7 However, only those complaints brought by a member
government alleging a persistent pattern of failure by another member government
to enforce its environmental regulations will have any impact.2"' As of yet, no
governmental complaint carrying the threat of sanctions has been brought before
the commission. 19
Supporters claimed that increased resources to fund cleanup projects and im-
prove environmental enforcement would be a direct result of free trade between the
United States and Mexico.22° However, forces other than the free trade agreement
produced the opposite effect.22' "[T]he collapse of the peso, astronomical interest
rates and unfavorable exchange rates have undermined Mexico's ability to invest in
health and environmental infrastructure in border states. .. ,22 Due to Mexico's
economic problems, the cost of sewage treatment and hazardous waste disposal
equipment, which is imported from the United States, has risen by about 50 per-
cent.223 Thus, environmental degradation in Mexico, such as increased air and wa-
ter pollution and hazardous waste dumping, have not been offset by any improve-
ments in the environmental infrastructure.224
NAFTA supporters claimed that the trade agreement would help curb the
pollution-related diseases along the U.S.-Mexico border. 225 This has not been
the case.226 In fact, pollution along the border has not diminished, and some say
the cases of pollution-related diseases are rising. 227 This may be attributed to
Mexico's dire economic straits, which has left many environmental projects se-
verely underfunded.228
A key battle cry for the NAFTA opposition was that the environmental welfare
along the border would decrease due to the increased industrialization and pollu-
tion.229 In an attempt to gain support from environmentalists, "Clinton officials
promised $6 billion to $8 billion would be spent to clean up the divide over 10
years. 230 In addition, the free trade agreement was expected to open up the
216. Bacon, supra note 213, at 4. The first complaint submitted dealt with the death of nearly




220. Reviewing Two Years Under NAFTA, Group Says "E" Problems Increasing, AIR/WATER
POLLUTION REP. ENV'T. WK., Jan. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7980831 (citing PUBLIC CITIZEN,









229. Nancy Nusser, NAFTA Hasn't Cleaned Border, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 2, 1996, at 8B.
230. Id.
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Mexican interior to industrialization, thereby curtailing the growth of maquila-
doras.2 3 ' However, the size of the maquiladora industry has increased by 20
percent since the accord passed. 32
NAFTA has not created or funded the environmental oversight bodies it prom-
ised.233 The funding for the bodies was not secured and now, coupled with Mexi-
co's economic hardships, projects that were being built before NAFTA have
stopped due to lack of funding.234 In addition, the CEC was not even fully staffed
until 1996.35
In response to complaints of NAFTA failures, supporters argue that inadequate
time for the multinational bodies to have an effect has been provided. 36 Regard-
less, expectations that industries would relocate away from the border to Mexico's
interior have failed to materialize. 237 Rather, the maquiladora industry has reaped
the benefit of the free trade agreement, growing more than 20 percent, and thus
increasing the environmental problems in the border regions. 38
"NAFTA supporters forecasted that free trade would generate increased re-
sources to fund cleanup projects and improve environmental enforcement. 39 In-
stead, Mexico has suffered a severe economic downturn over the last two
years."240 The decline in the peso's strength, combined with high interest rates,
meant that few resources were available to purchase new pollution abatement or
remediation equipment.24 ' Furthermore, critics allege that illegal industrial waste
dumping in Mexico, rising air pollution, and poor industrial waste disposal, water
supplies, and sewage treatment are leading to an upswing in rates of birth defects
and such infectious disease as dysentery and hepatitis.242
In conclusion, the collapse of the peso has meant massive cutbacks in spending
by both Mexico's federal and local governments.2 43 The severity of the spending
cuts has forced Mexico to halt participation in some border environmental proj-
ects. 244 "At the same time, the Republican-led U.S. Congress has also cut funding
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11.
234. Wendy Koch, Environmental Promises Broken?, Wis. ST. J., Jan. 2, 1996, at Al.
235. Id. The Environmental Defense Fund said that NAFTA critics should not expect the trade
pact to be an environmental cure-all. Id. But it does provide "tools," including the aforementioned
groups, that wouldn't otherwise exist. Id.
236. Free Trade in North America Said Damaging Environment, WORLD ENV'T. REP., Jan. 17,
1996, available in 1996 WL 8169273.
237. Id.
238. Id. The maquiladora workforce has grown 20% from 546,588 in December 1993 to 689,420




242. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11, Ch. 5.
243. U.S.-Mexico: Citizens's Group Deplores NAFTA Failures on Border, INTER. PRESS SERV.,
Jan. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7880794.
244. Id.
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for border programs, while the World Bank has rearranged its loan portfolio to
Mexico to the detriment of environmental programs." 245 As a result, the size of
the maquiladora industry in the border areas has risen sharply since NAFTA
took effect. 246 In addition, the NAFTA-related institutions, mainly the CEC,
IBEP, and the North American Development Bank, have done little to ameliorate
the border problem.247
IV. Chile
A. CHILEAN ACCESSION TO NAFTA
In December of 1994, President Clinton formally invited Chile to become
the fourth member nation of NAFTA during the Summit of the Americas. 4 s
Unfortunately, the heated debate between trade and the environment that sur-
rounded the passage of NAFTA has reemerged. 249 Although similar arguments
abound, the new focus is on granting the Clinton administration fast-track author-




248. Lacunza, supra note 17, at 541. Rev. 539, 541. "Chile has emerged from the debt crisis
of the early t980s powered by the fastest growing and most successful economy in Latin America."
Id. at 540-41. In addition, a peaceful transition from a military dictatorship to a bona fide democracy
has made Chile an appealing prospect to its North American neighbors. Id. But talks were stalled
when Congress failed to authorize fast-track authority to President Clinton. Chilean Minister Sees
NAFTA Entry Progress Frozen, Reuters, Nov. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws
File [hereinafter Reuters]. "Fast-track" authorization enables the president to negotiate trade deals
with the assurance that Congress will consider the agreement as is, with no amendments. Block &
Herrup, supra, note 1I, at 229. This authorization allows the president to negotiate knowing that
a final agreement will not be altered substantially by the time it emerges from congressional debate.
Id. Although formal negotiations were launched in June 1995, talks were effectively stalled by the
end of the year after Congress failed to provide President Clinton with fast-track authority. Id.
Reuters, supra. Clinton wants "fast-track" authority to apply to Chile's accession to NAFTA and
the authority to negotiate labor and environmental side agreements. Mike Pariente, New Kid on the
Block: Chile's Struggle to Join the North American Free Trade Agreement, HisPANiC, Apr. 1, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 12312825. Congress, however, coupled with many U.S. businesses, opposes
inclusion of labor and environmental considerations. Id. In general, Republicans argue that trade
agreements should be limited to issues of trade, while Democrats maintain that side agreements
addressing labor and environmental issues should be affixed to free trade arrangements. Block &
Herrup, supra note 11, at 230-31. The issue with Chile is whether the United States will require
side agreements in a free trade accord, as with Mexico, or whether the United States will limit its
negotiations strictly to issues of free trade. Id. at 233-34.
If Clinton decides to pursue negotiating with Chile without the fast track authority,
Congress could add amendments that weaken labor and environmental safeguards.
Id. If the United States fails to bring Chile into NAFTA, it will likely sour future
trade efforts for Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela, who have expressed a strong
interest in joining NAFTA. Only if fast-track is granted can all four nations be assured
that the general NAFTA will be left intact and out of the hands of special interests.
Pariente, supra.
249. Bivona, supra note 51.
250. Id.
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only on trade legislation as presented, without the opportunity to make amend-
ments. "'5 This authority played a key role in the negotiation and rapid enactment
of NAFTA.252 Ironically, fast-track authority now impedes Chilean accession.253
The fast-track authority granted to Clinton for NAFTA has since lapsed, and
"Congressional opponents to [the] NAFTA have been reluctant to renew fast-
track because of concern that Chile might try to avoid signing on to labor and
environmental side agreements to the trade pact, although. . .Chile has indicated
that it is willing to sign on to [the] NAFTA side agreements.- 254
Further, the devaluation of the Mexican peso will impede Chile's efforts for
accession to NAFTA.255 The peso crisis will cast a negative shadow over
NAFTA.256 Chile's accession bid will not be completely lost because of Mexico's
economic woes, but it will cause those in a position to help or hurt Chile to take
a second look at NAFTA.257
Those opposed to Chile's inclusion point out that proponents hailed NAFTA
as the "greenest trade agreement ever," but despite such praise, little has been
done to address environmental problems.258 In addition, opponents warn that
"[u]nlike Mexico, which has environmental laws but weak enforcement, Chile
has few environmental laws to enforce.', 25 9 U.S. companies in industries that
compete with Chile are calling for the United States to lower its standards because
they see Chile's resource laws as an unfair trade advantage. 26 Opponents of
Chile's admission argue, "[a]dding Chile to NAFTA and its side agreements as
they stand would be merely cosmetic-it would keep trade agreements looking
environmentally and socially correct-rather than a real attempt to deal with the
substance of the problem. ,261 Thus, opponents argue that labor and environmental
side agreements should be the starting point for negotiations on Chile's accession
to NAFTA.262 They argue the side agreements should be the minimum standards
for free trade because "[e]ach new trading partner wanting to join NAFTA will
have unique circumstances that must be brought to the bargaining table. 263
251. Id. at 168 (citing NAFTA: NAFTA Countries Begin Technical Negotiations for Chilean Acces-
sion, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (July 25, 1995)).






258. Andrea Durbin, Move Carefully in Adding Chile to NAFTA Club, HOUSTON CHRON., June
7, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5907408.
259. Id.
260. Id. Minerals, timber, agriculture, and fishstock account for 90% of Chilean exports. Id. See
generally NAFTA, supra note 5. Opponents charge that NAFTA, despite its green language, fails
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B. CHILE'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAWS
Chile arose from debt crisis in the early 1980s to achieve the fastest growing
and most successful economy in Latin America. 264 Further, "Chile's peaceful
transition in 1990 from a military dictatorship to a bona fide democracy has made
Chile an appealing prospect to its North American neighbors." 265 The political
transformation, coupled with its economic success, has given Chile a "proven
track record for political and economic stability over recent years." 2 66 Due to
the type of political and economic systems in Chile, the United States sees Chile
as a model candidate for a free trade agreement.2 6 7 The United States' enthusiasm
for Chile's trading potential has risen such that Clinton has referred to Chile as
the ideal trading partner.
268
Although the economic development of Chile is impressive, Chile's environ-
ment paid the price for such growth. 69 In the past, Chile neglected the environment
in numerous ways by channeling efforts on rapid economic development. 270 "Un-
regulated growth has saddled the country with serious environmental challenges,
including severe air pollution, extensive deforestation, and widespread water
contamination." 27' During the economic upswing, Chile depended on industries
that degraded the environment and exploited natural resources. 272 As a result,
Chile paid the price for economic development by reeking havoc on its environ-
ment.273
Chile's Constitution guarantees to all persons the right to live in an environment
free from contamination.274 It further states that it is the duty of the State to
watch over the protection of this right.275 In the wake of political change, Chile's
transition administration shifted concentration away from economic development
by creating a new environmental mandate designed to fight the environmental
264. Lacunza, supra note 17, at 540-41 (citing Nathaniel C. Nash, Terrorism Jolts a Prospering
Chile, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at DI).
265. Id. at 541 (citing Kirsteen Macleod, Chile Mulls No. 4 Spot in NAFTA: Fast Growing Economy
Rated Safest Country in Latin America for Foreign Investment, FIN. POST, Sept. 17, 1993, sl,
at 9).
266. Id. (citing Roger Turner, Model Economy Offers High Degree of Stability; Chile; 1993 World
Trade Outlook, Bus. AM., Apr. 19, 1993, at 13).
267. Id. (citing Michael G. Wilson, U.S. -Chile Free Trade Agreement Igniting Economic Prosper-
ity in the Americas, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., July 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Hfrpts File).
268. Id. (citing Chile Invited to Join NAFTA, Reuters World Service, Dec. 11, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Reuwld File).
269. Id. at 542.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citing Business Outlook: Chile's Favorable Business Climate, Bus. LATIN AM., July
19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File).
273. Id. (citing Nathaniel C. Nash, Chileans Pay Dearly for Economic Growth, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1991, at 6).
274. Id. at 539 (citing CHILE CONST. ch. III, art. 19, § 8 (1980)).
275. Id.
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devastation caused by years of economic prosperity.276 In furtherance of this
mandate, Chile passed the country's most comprehensive environmental protec-
tion measure, the Environmental Framework Law of 1994, as well as enacted
several key executive decrees.277 Thus, Chile is striving to reconcile the many
environmental problems that resulted from its push for economic prosperity.278
The Chilean economy's focal point is natural resources, such as mining, for-
estry, fishing, and agriculture.2 79 The environmental degradation that faced Chile
has been attributed to the following:
[t]he free market model implemented by the military regime [of Pinochet] encouraged
the exploitation of Chile's resources, and the economic system itself discouraged govern-
mental interference. The push for economic growth and the openness of the free market
system displaced any motivation for effective environmental regulation during the bulk
of the Pinochet years. As a result, Chile was notoriously lax in enforcing existing
environmental laws to counter the destructive trends of its enormous economic growth.
Instead, Pinochet let industries and businesses pollute and exploit resources essentially
at will. By 1990 Chile was described as a "catalogue of ecological disasters," the
result of economic development at the expense of the environment.2 80
This rapid economic growth continued even after Chile held its first democratic
elections in seventeen years in March of 1990.28 ' The transitional administration
of President Aylwin, so called because of the transition from dictatorship to
democracy, set political stability and continued economic development as its
preliminary goals.282 Aylwin did, however, introduce environmental regulations
by the middle of his term.283 "Chile's environmental problems forced the country
to reduce its dependance on industries that exploit natural resources and, in the
process, pollute the environment. "284
When the Aylwin administration came to power, it focused on proving that
a democratic government could succeed in Chile and could continue the economic
growth established under military rule.285 Thus, Aylwin's initial environmental
policy consisted of implementing emergency measures when necessary. 86 "In
276. Id. at 550. The term "transition administration" is a reference to the administration of
Patricio Aylwin, as it was the transition from the military regime to the present democratic system.
Id.
277. Id. at 553-54.
278. Id. at 543.
279: Id. at 547.
280. Id. (citing Paul Mylrea, Chile's Capital, Plagued by Smog, Begins to Fight Back, Reuter
Libr. Rep., Sept 14, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File).
281. Id. at 550.
282. Id. at 550. As a manifestation of its commitment to economic development, Aylwin retained
the free market system put in place by his predecessor and reaffirmed Chile's commitment to the
growth of the private sector. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. (citing Changing Priorities: Anticipated Changes in Patterns, Bus. LATIN AM., Sept.
27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File).
285. Id. at 551.
286. Id.
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essence, the basic environmental system itself was in dire need of fundamental
restructuring. The system scattered much of the jurisdictional responsibility
among several different agencies, resulting in overlap, confusion, and, ultimately,
an inadequate enforcement apparatus." 287 Adding to this, the government agen-
cies responsible for the enforcement of environmental regulations had no knowl-
edge of the existence of many environmental laws.288
As a first step to correct the environmental degradation resulting from years of
prosperity, the Aylwin administration officially endorsed the policy of sustainable
development. 2 9 This policy placed environmental issues near the top of the admin-
istration's agenda, in direct contrast to the policies of the former military re-
gime. 290 Thus, by 1992, policies dealing with sustainable development, ozone
layer depletion, erosion, and pollution became key concerns for Aylwin's transi-
tion administration.291
Out of these new policies, the Aylwin administration enacted several key regu-
lations dealing with environmental reform.292 The government first addressed
the environmental concerns requiring the most dire need of attention. 293 "Chile's
three worst areas of environmental degradation soon became the administration's
top three environmental priorities: Santiago's severe air pollution, widespread
water contamination, and pollution caused by the mining industry." 29 Next, in
addition to implementing regulatory decrees and in response to growing public
concern over the environment, the government began to move towards improving
the flaws in Chile's basic environmental regulatory system. 95 In 1993, the Na-
287. Id. (citing Achieving World Class as a Polluter; Mining Industry Is Main Source of Sulphuric
Acid Emission, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Mar. 19, 1992, at 11, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txtnws File). See also Lauren Bradbury, Environmental Reform Is Under Way in Chile, Bus. Am.,
Aug. 23, 1993, at 6. The article describes the system as follows:
In addition to the cumbersome assortment of laws and decrees, a major impediment
to enforcement of Chile's environmental regulations is the mix of authority between
the country's different ministries. There are more than 70 offices and agencies with
some kind of environmental authority, but no one ministry has either full control or
responsibility for environmental policy, creating conflict and confusion.
Id.
288. Lacunza, supra note 17, at 552 (citing Chilean Officials Review Environmental Laws and
Plan New Ones, ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM., Nov. 1991, available in LEXIS, Market Library, lacnws
File).
289. Id. (citing Enrique Martini, Environment: Chile Finalizes Its Position for the Earth Summit,
Inter Press Service, Feb. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Inpres File).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 553.
293. Id.
294. Id. (citing Achieving World Class as a Polluter; Mining Industry Is Main Source of Sulphuric
Acid Emissions, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Mar. 19, 1992, at 11, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txtnws File).
295. Id. One such decree was Decree 185. Chilean Government Promotes New Sense of Environ-
mental Responsibility, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 309 (Apr. 21, 1993). This corrective provision
was implemented to stem the tide of the increasingly dangerous levels of toxic emissions caused by
unregulated dumping of hazardous waste by the mining industry. Id. The purpose of the decree was
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tional Committee for the Environment (CONAMA) the agency responsible for the
organization of environmental policy in Chile, published an 845-page document,
containing 2700 separate items, that attempted to catalog the existing environmen-
tal laws in Chile.2 96 In 1994, Aylwin signed the Environmental Framework Law,
which was the first comprehensive environmental law in Chile's history.2 97 "The
Framework Law provides Chile with a comprehensive scheme for existing and
future environmental regulations that will facilitate the coordination and enforce-
ment of Chile's environmental laws." 2 9' The Framework Law empowers the
Chilean government to create a regulatory scheme that will effectively balance
299the management and protection of its natural resources.
1. Motivations Behind the Framework Law
The enactment of the Framework Law satisfied Chile's need for an environmen-
tal law with the capacity to regulate business and government agencies." °° "Prior
to the enactment of the Framework Law, government agencies often worked
across the regulatory board, causing uncertainty and adding layers of bureaucracy
to the enforcement of environmental rules. 30 ' The Framework Law remedied
this problem by establishing a framework for Chile's existing environmental
laws. 302
The possibility of accession to NAFTA was a key element in Chile's environ-
mental reform efforts.3 °3 "[T]he prospect of free trade with the United States
was a powerful motivator and provided Chile with added incentive to implement
to control the emission levels of plants. Id. In order to accomplish this goal, the levels of sulfur,
arsenic, and particulate matter emissions were regulated. Achieving World Class as a Polluter: Mining
Industry Is Main Source of Sulphuric Acid Emissions, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Mar. 19, 1992, at
11. The decree divided the country into two regions. Lacunza, supra note 17, at 574. The central
and southern sections of Chile, where the majority of the population is located, have stricter standards
than the scantily populated northern region. Id. The more densely populated southern region has a
maximum limit of 260 micrograms per cubic meter of air; while a less stringent level of 365
micrograms per cubic meter of air was set for the northern area. Id. In addition, all smelters were
forced to decontaminate their emissions. Id. at 574-75.
296. Bradbury, supra note 287, at 6. Aylwin attempted to curtail the damage to the environment
caused by Pinochet's regime by enacting numerous laws and regulations. Karin Ranta, Balancing
Hardrock Mining and the Environment: The Chilean Model, 6 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
432, 430 (1995). In his attempt, however, Aylwin failed to create a uniform body of law and a
regulatory board to monitor the progress of environmental reform and to enforce the newly enacted
laws. Id. Therefore, to eliminate the conflicts and confusion surrounding these regulations,.Decree
185 created the governing body responsible for promoting the environmental policies of Chile,
CONOMA. Id. at 432. The government granted CONOMA temporary authority to enforce the
provisions of Decree 185 while developing an environmental framework law. Id.
297. Lacunza, supra note 17, at 553-54.
298. Id. at 554.
299. Id.
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environmental reforms. "'04 Because the government focused first on stabilizing
itself politically and economically, Aylwin's administration did not initially ad-
dress environmental concerns.30 5 Perhaps one triggering event for Chile's envi-
ronmental reform was a mid-1992 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office
that alluded that Chile's accession to NAFTA would be in danger if Chile contin-
ued to ignore the environment. 306 The report noted that, in addition to a general
lack of sufficient regulations, the existing environmental laws in Chile were
unknown or ignored. 30 7 The office of the U.S. Trade Representative indicated
clearly that certain minimum environmental requirements would have to be met
by any countries interested in joining a free trade agreement with the United
States.308
2. Anatomy of the Framework Law
The Framework Law is intended to "coordinate environmental regulations
and enforcement" between government agencies and is to be the base from
which many environmental regulations can be launched.3°9 The law requires
environmental impact studies for most new projects that will harm the environ-
ment. 310 It further requires polluters to formulate cleanup plans, and it defines
a dispute resolution system for environmental claims.31
The Framework Law designates CONAMA as the country's central environ-
mental protection agency, giving it "the authority to develop environmental policy
and oversee implementation of specific regulations by other agencies.-
3 2
304. Id.
305. Id. at 584.
306. Alexander Huneeus, Chile Environmental Mess Prompts Warning by U.S., S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 7. 1992, at A9. The United States was concerned that Chile's economy had been using its
unregulated environmental system as a lure for foreign investment. Id. For instance, between 1987
and 1992, investment in the Canadian mining sector had been steadily decreasing as investors headed
for countries like Chile with, among other benefits, less stringent environmental regulations. Lacunza,
supra note 17 (citing Toronto Mining Industry Begins Campaign, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 24, 1993,
at C3).
307. Huneeus, supra note 306.
308. Lacunza, supra note 17, at 584-85 (citing North American Nations Ratify NAFTA, Endorse
Environmental Protection as Vital Cross-Border Issue, ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM., Dec. 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, Market Library, lacnws File).
309. Id. at 586 (citing CONAMA Creates Guidelines to Evaluate Environmental Impact Studies,
ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM., Nov. 1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File). Prior
to the Framework Law, Chile enacted numerous environmental laws to correct its ecological problems.
Id. Chile lacked, however, a comprehensive system to oversee the reform efforts. Id. at 583. The
goal of the Framework Law is to organize Chile's existing environmental regulations and coordinate
the enforcement of the laws. Id.
310. Chilean Senate Passes Environmental Framework Law, ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM., Sept.
1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
311. Lacunza, supra note 17, at 586-87 (citing Chilean Congress Approves Environmental Frame-
work Law, Bus. LATIN AM., Feb. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File).
312. Chilean Senate Passes Environmental Framework, supra note 310. The Framework Law
redefined the role of CONOMA in monitoring environmental reform. Ranta, supra note 301, at
433. Regional branches of CONOMA, Consejo Regional de Medio Ambiente, or COREMAs, are
SPRING 1998
182 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
CONAMA oversees the efforts of the regional ministries (COREMAs), but retains
final authority. 313 "Thus, CONAMA is the sole government agency in charge
of pollution issues, and the agency has the authority to solve any disputes to
ensure new standards are enforced properly with minimal agency or ministry
overlap.' ,114
Similar to other Latin American codes, the Framework Law does not contain
specific regulations on environmental standards. 315 The Framework Law is com-
prised of sweeping guidelines for environmental quality and policy, leaving the
specific standards to CONAMA and the legislature.31 6
a. Environmental Impact Statements
"A major element to the Framework Law is that it requires virtually all new
major projects, private or public, to submit an Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) or an Environmental Impact Declaration (EID) to CONAMA or a Regional
Environmental Commission (COREMA) ... for approval." 317 The EIA system
is intended to enable the government to determine the potential environmental
impact of a proposed project. 31" For those potential projects that (1) create a risk
to the welfare of the general public; (2) have adverse effects on renewable natural
resources, lifestyles, customs, or tourism; or (3) create significant environmental
impacts, an EIA is required.319 If the project does not create a risk to any of the
above-mentioned items, only an EID is required. Once an assessment of declara-
tion is submitted, both CONAMA and the appropriate regional COREMA review
the report for errors in the assessment of potential ecological harm.3 20 Despite
the inclusion of the regional COREMA in the evaluation process, CONAMA
has final authority to approve the project.32' Further, despite mandating assess-
responsible for the actual enforcement of the laws. Id. The COREMAs' duty to monitor is triggered
when its particular region is affected. Id. By delegating the authority to enforce the Framework Law
to the particular region affected, CONOMA is able to administer and monitor the effectiveness of
the regulations. Id.
313. Lacunza, supra note 17, at 586.
314. Id. (citing Environmental Law, Investing Licensing & Trading, Feb. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiuilt File).
315. Id. at 587.
316. Id.
317. Id. (citing Chile's Framework Environmental Law Goes to Congress for Debate, ENV'T
WATCH LATIN AM., Oct. 1992, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File).
318. Id.
319. Jose Antonio Urrutia, The Extraterritorial Scope of U.S. Environmental Laws: The Case of
Chile, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 45, 46 (1995). Projects that require full assessments include
dams, irrigation projects, thermoelectric and hydroelectric power generators, urban and tourist resort
developments, oil and gas pipelines, aqueducts, and mining-related operations. Lacunza, supra note
17, at 587.
320. Lacunza, supra note 17, at 588.
321. Id.
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ments for new projects, the Framework Law does not mandate them for existing
operations or public works projects.322
b. Liability under the Framework Law
In addition to providing for Environmental Impact Statements, the Framework
Law establishes a system of civil liability based on the "polluter pays" princi-
ple.323 As a result, a new type of lawsuit, the "environmental action," was created,
by which citizens or government authorities may bring suit against individuals and
organizations seeking redress for the environment.324 The civil liability system
established is not based on intent. 325 All that must be shown under the Framework
Law is that environmental damage occurred in violation of an existing environ-
mental regulation.326
c. Compliance
The Law recognizes that immediate and complete compliance with the Frame-
work Law by businesses runs contrary to continued economic growth. 327 The
Framework Law is designed to limit the growth of pollution without "unduly
threatening existing industries with immediate fines or impractical cleanup sched-
ules. "328 As a result, environmental programs in Chile will continue to be negoti-
ated on a individual basis.329
In summary, the Framework Law establishes several new administrative
and judicial procedures.33 ° Citizens and nongovernmental organizations are
now able to challenge polluters through the legal system. 33' This is crucial
since the government of Chile is a major polluter. 332 "[T]he Framework Law
provides Chile with an institutional foundation that will allow the government
to create an efficient, competent, and enforceable regulatory scheme. ,333 The
government now has in place the structure necessary to revamp its outdated
system of statutes and regulations.334 Finally, the Framework Law centralizes
322. Id. Though not required nationally, many companies in Chile voluntarily conducted impact
studies prior to the law's passage.
323. Id. (citing Environmental Regulations: Chile, Bus. LATIN AM., May 23, 1994, available










333. Id. (citing Chile: Moving Towards Greener Pastures, Bus. LATIN AM., Apr. 25, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File).
334. Id.
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the regulation process, putting an end to overlapping authority and competing
regulations between ministries.
3. Opposition to the Framework Law
Although not universally endorsed, the Framework Law has raised relatively
few criticisms. 36 Companies affected by the Framework Law offered little objec-
tion to its enactment because "the law implements changes gradually and gives
them time to clean up existing facilities without unreasonable deadlines or threats
of immediate fines." 337 In addition, companies are not responsible for past pollu-
tion cleanup costs, unless shown that at the time of contamination, they were in
violation of an existing environmental law .338 Thus, because the Framework Law
has the potential to explain the rights and duties of private and public entities,
businesses have accepted its enactment.339
C. FREE TRADE PROSPECTS
Chile became a top prospect in Latin America for joining NAFTA due to the
Framework Law and its political stability.3 °
Today's Latin America is a tempting prospect for integration. In stark contrast to the
closed, protectionist Latin America of the earlier half of the century, contemporary
Latin America is increasingly open, democratic, and stable. This new-found stability
and receptiveness to open trade have sparked a dramatic increase in the level of foreign
investment in the region .... 341
Political stability, coupled with receptiveness to foreign investment, has helped
Latin American countries resemble their more-developed neighbors to the
North.342 Unfortunately, the environmental law reforms in Latin America have
not kept pace with its enormous economic growth. 343 "Lagging environmental
reform presents an obstacle to Latin American integration because any offer of
335. Id. (citing Chile: Moving Towards Greener Pastures, Bus. LATIN AM., Apr. 25 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File).
336. Id. at 590.
337. Id. (citing Chile: Moving Towards Greener Pastures, Bus. LATIN Am., Apr. 25, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Eiubla File).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET-U.S. & CHILE TRADE RELATIONS (Feb. 27, 1997).
341. Russel M. Lazega, NAFTA Accession and Environmental Protection: The Prospects for an
"Earth Friendly" Integration of Latin American Nations into the North American Trading Bloc, 5
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'v 315, 316 (1996). Estimates are that direct investment in Chile has
skyrocketed from $3.1 billion in 1984 to $21 billion just 10 years later. Id. at 339 n. 10 (citing Martha
M. Hamilton, The Latin Boom Roots of Recovery Began Decades Before This Week's Summit of the
Americas, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1994, at HI). In addition, "[n]et capital flows into Latin America
soared from $25 billion in 1990, to $69 billion in 1993. The United States, in particular, has stepped-up
investment into the region, pouring in over $52 billion in 1992, a steady increase from the $42 billion
in 1989." Id.
342. Id. at 316.
343. Id. at 317.
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accession to NAFTA will almost certainly be predicated on the acceding country
entering into an environmental side agreement similar to the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation ... ""
Chile has addressed Latin America's general lag in environmental reform as
opposed to economic growth.345 As for the prospect of conditioning accession
of a Latin American country to NAFTA on an environmental side agreement,
Chile now has the laws in place to deal with such a condition.346 Further, Chile
has expressed a willingness to sign a side agreement similar to the NAAEC. 347
In addition, many Latin American countries see their lack of environmental
laws as a competitive advantage that they would be forced to surrender in order
to bring their domestic law up to par with North American standards. 34 8 "Inte-
grating the rest of Latin America under side agreements similar to the NAAEC
side-agreement may prove complicated. 349 Unlike Mexico, Canada, the United
States, and now Chile, Latin America lacks sufficient environmental law and
provides only weak enforcement of their existing environmental laws.350 Chile's
problem is not unlike that of Mexico when the NAFTA was first proposed;
namely, lack of enforcement.351 More importantly, Chilean officials have sug-
gested that it is now "up to the challenge" of negotiating a side accord.352 Thus,
given Chile's economic growth, industrial base, and willingness to comply with
environmental provisions, Chile is the logical choice for the first Latin American
country to join the NAFTA.353
In furtherance of its newfound dedication to the enforcement of its environmen-
tal laws, Chile entered into a bi-lateral free trade agreement with Canada.3 4 It
344. Id.
345. See Lacunza, supra note 17, at 587. The Framework Law was passed for two main reasons:
(1) to address the environmental havoc reeked by its out-of-control economy, and (2) to make Chile
look more appealing as a trading partner to the North American countries. Id. at 583.
346. See generally id. at 583-90. The NAAEC basically is an agreement between members to
enforce their existing environmental laws. Lazega, supra note 341, at 324. Many Latin American
countries do not have sufficient existing environmental laws to satisfy the requirements for NAFTA
accession. Id. at 331.
347. Lazega, supra note 346, at 341 n. 153.
348. Id. at 333.
349. Id. at 331.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 333 (citing Gabriel Escobar, Various Lobbies Pose Tough Choices for Chile as It
Prepares to Join NAFTA, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1994, at A33).
352. Id.
353. Id. Chile's GDP over the past five years has grown at an average annual rate of 7%, making
it one of the fastest growing economies. Id. at 339 n. 156 (citing David Gilmore, Expanding NAFTA
to Include All of the Western Hemisphere: Making Chile the Next Member, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAC.
413, 416 (1994)). Chile's industries can expect a fairly hospitable competitive environment under
NAFTA because many of the industries complement, rather than compete with, U.S. industries. Id.
at 333. For example, Chile's growing season is opposite the United States' growing season. Id. at
339 n. 158.
354. Howard Williams, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Chilean President Eduardo
Frei Signed a Free Trade Agreement Monday Between Their Two Countries, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Nov. 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12183511.
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went into effect on July 1, 1997."' 5 The agreement "is modeled on NAFTA and
is ... a provisional agreement to facilitate Chilean accession to NAFTA. "
35 6
It contains two side agreements dealing with labor and the environment.357 These
side agreements are strikingly similar to the side accords Mexico signed as a
condition of accession into NAFTA . 318 There are, however, differences between
the Chilean-Canadian accord and NAFTA. 35 9 For example, under the Chilean-
Canadian agreement, "Chile and Canada are committed to forgo imposing anti-
dumping and countervailing duties within 6 years after the agreement goes into
effect. NAFTA, on the other hand, does not affect member countries' ability
to unilaterally impose antidumping measures and countervailing duties. ,360 In
addition, this agreement excludes intellectual property rights and financial ser-
vices. 36' The Chilean-Canadian free trade accord is an important step towards
the accession of Chile into NAFTA, but Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien
warned, "if the United States and Mexico did not hurry up with an agreement
to expand NAFTA to include Chile, the goal of negotiating a pan-American Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005-promised at a hemispheric summit
in Miami in 1994-would not be attainable." 362 Further, Mexico and Chile signed
a bilateral free trade agreement in 1992.363 "This agreement calls for a phased
tariff elimination between the parties. It excludes many product categories such
as agricultural commodities."36' However, Mexico and Chile are in the process
of renegotiating the agreement to broaden its scope.365 Thus, Chile already has
free trade agreements with two-thirds of the NAFTA members.
V. Conclusion
NAFTA and the NAAEC comprise the greenest free trade agreement to date. 
3 66
Yet, the environmental provisions contained in NAFTA and the NAAEC have
not pulled their weight thus far.367 Many of the promises made by NAFTA advo-
cates in the pre-adoption debate over NAFTA have failed to materialize.3 68 The
establishment of the environmental agencies required under the agreement has
been slow, and the implementation of the environmental provisions has been
355. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 10.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 14.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 10.
362. Williams, supra note 354.
363. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Durbin, supra note 258, at 1.
367. See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11.
368. Id.
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even slower.3 69 Thus, although NAFTA and the NAAEC set a precedent for the
environment in free trade agreements, more needs to be done to ensure adequate
enforcement of the environmental provisions. 370 Chile represents the best prospect
for a free trade agreement in Latin America.3 71 To this end, Chile is already a
party to free trade agreements with two-thirds of the NAFTA countries.372 If the
United States does not move quickly in bringing Chile into NAFTA, Chile may
lose patience and become involved with other free trade agreements, which could
result in the United States losing out in trading with the most prosperous economy
in Latin America. 3 73 Chile has shown a commitment to environmental policies and
seems to want to continue these polices in the face of economic development. 374
Mexico, on the other hand, seems content to remain stagnant in regards to enforc-
ing its environmental laws.375 Chile's motivation to enact environmental laws
may have been similar to that of Mexico, namely accession into NAFTA, but
at least it has shown some intention to follow through and enforce them.376
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Durbin, supra note 258 (citing Chile Invited to Join NAFTA, Reuters World Serv., Dec.
11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Reuwld File).
372. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1.
373. Id.
374. See generally Lacunza, supra note 17; Lazega, supra note 341.
375. See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 11.
376. See generally Lacunza, supra note 17; Lazega, supra note 341.
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